

## TWO PROPER NAMES IN THE TEXT OF DIODORUS, BOOK 15

Both patently incorrect readings and long-established emendations have a habit of retaining their places in texts of ancient authors with few or no questions asked. This paper considers two examples of this phenomenon (one of each type) in Book 15 of Diodorus' *Bibliothēke*.<sup>1</sup>

### I

During the campaign that led to the second Battle of Mantinea in 362, Epaminondas attempted a surprise attack on and capture of the city of Sparta.<sup>2</sup> In 15.82.6 Diodorus writes that the stratagem was thwarted because the Spartan king in command of the full Spartan levy in the area of Tegea (Epaminondas' Arcadian Headquarters<sup>3</sup>) guessed what the Theban general was planning and sent a message to those left behind in Sparta to warn them and promise his own immediate return to assist in the defence of the city. The problem is that, according to modern texts, Diodorus calls this king Agis.

That cannot, of course, be correct. The Spartan kings in 362 were Agesilaus and Cleomenes II, and no Agis ruled Sparta between c. 400 and 338. Moreover, other sources make it clear who the king in question ought to be. Xenophon<sup>4</sup> says that Epaminondas decided to march on Sparta when he discovered that the anti-Thebans massed at Mantinea had sent for reinforcements under Agesilaus<sup>5</sup> and that the latter had already reached Pellene, a few miles north of Sparta on the westerly route into Arcadia. Unfortunately for Epaminondas, Agesilaus heard what he was doing and was able to return to Sparta in the nick of time. Plutarch, who was following Xenophon's account at least in part,<sup>6</sup> also says that Agesilaus had marched out and was approaching Mantinea/Tegea.<sup>7</sup> Polybius, on the other hand, asserts that the full Spartan levy was already at Mantinea when Epaminondas first came to Tegea, and implies that Agesilaus was there in command of it; for the deserter who informed the Spartan king of Epaminondas' intentions came to Mantinea.<sup>8</sup> Agesilaus reappeared at Sparta after the first fighting there had started and the Thebans had advanced as far as the agora.<sup>9</sup> If it is the case that Polybius was following the account of Callisthenes,<sup>10</sup> then one might suppose that Plutarch suppresses Xenophon's

<sup>1</sup> 'Chabrias' in Diod. 15.36.4 may be another example of the first type, though for the moment I do not see my way to a solution of that passage. For another example of an emendation, long accepted but perhaps wrongly, see my paper 'The Athenian Embassy to Sparta in 372/1' in *Liverpool Classical Monthly* 2 (1977), 51 f., on the text of Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.2.

<sup>2</sup> Sources: Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.9 f.; Diod. 15.82.5 f.; Polyb. 9.8.2 f.; Plut. *Ages.* 34; Aen. *Tact.* 2.2; Justin 6.7; Polyæn. 2.3.10; Front. *Strat.* 3.11.5.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.9.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> There were already three lochoi, a mercenary-force, and cavalry at Mantinea, Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.10.

<sup>6</sup> *Ages.* 34.4.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* 3

<sup>8</sup> *Loc. cit.* (n. 2).

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> e.g. L. Peper, *De Plutarchi Epaminonda* (Weidae, 1912) p. 98 n. 4; F. Jacoby, *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker II D* (Berlin, 1930), p. 425.

opinion that Agesilaus was only a short distance from Sparta when Epaminondas acted in an attempt to reconcile Xenophon and Callisthenes, whose version was also known to him.<sup>11</sup> Be that as it may, in Polybius, as in Diodorus, there is a Spartan king in the region of Mantinea/Tegea at the start of the story. Other sources are less explicit on the matter, but Polyaeus has Agesilaus absent from Sparta (though able to return before the arrival of Epaminondas),<sup>12</sup> and Justin writes that the assaults on the city ended 'Agesilai adventu nuntiatio', implying a scenario like that of Polybius, in which Agesilaus is too far away from Sparta to anticipate Epaminondas' arrival there.<sup>13</sup>

There were thus different views about the exact whereabouts of Agesilaus, but there is agreement at least that he was in charge of a Spartan army that had marched out to face the Thebans and their allies in Arcadia. That is indeed what one would expect. It is true that age, and perhaps dislike of the shared command of the Athenian/Spartan alliance of 370/69 kept him out of the Peloponnesian campaigns of the 360s,<sup>14</sup> but just as the prospect of renewed, albeit indirect, attack on Persia could rouse him to action in 364 and 361,<sup>15</sup> so a new Theban intervention as far south as Tegea brought him into the field once more.

The facts therefore suggest that Diodorus 15.82.6 *ought* to name Agesilaus rather than 'Agis'. The question remains, mistake or textual corruption? It is true that there are other cases in which error seems to creep into Diodorus' treatment of Spartan royalty, namely 14.17 (Pausanias for Xenophon's Agis<sup>16</sup>) and 14.97.5 (Agesilaus for Xenophon's Agesipolis<sup>17</sup>). But I doubt whether these examples demonstrate that 15.82.6 is also a case of error.<sup>18</sup> In both 14.17 and 14.97.5 the confusion is between two contemporarily active kings; but that, as we saw, is not the case in 15.82.6. Again, the error in 14.97.5 was an easy one for Diodorus to fall into since both Agesilaus and Agesipolis did at different times carry out ravaging expeditions against Argos.<sup>19</sup> This sort of consideration does not obviously apply to 15.82.6. It is perhaps barely possible that a confusion with the first Battle of Mantinea, when a King Agis *was* in command, is involved,<sup>20</sup> but since at 15.82.6 the narrative has not yet reached the second Battle of Mantinea proper, I am inclined to discount that possibility. The case of Pausanias/Agis and the Elean War<sup>21</sup> present different problems. Here the accounts of Diodorus and Xenophon are quite different on a number of specific points besides the identity of the king in command. 'Pausanias' rather than 'Agis' is merely one aspect of the idiosyncratic account Diodorus found in his source; it does not arise from his error or the corruption of his text. I shall consider shortly the question of whether Diodorus' account in 15.82 is 'normal' enough to permit correction of it by comparison with other accounts (see below, pp. 349 f.). For the moment I suggest provisional acceptance of the thesis of

<sup>11</sup> Ages. 34.4.

<sup>12</sup> Loc. cit. (n. 2).

<sup>13</sup> Loc. cit. (n. 2).

<sup>14</sup> Age: Plut. Ages. 33.1. Shared command: Xen. Hell. 7.1.4.

<sup>15</sup> 364: Xen. Ages. 2.26 f., Nep. Timoth. 1.3; 361: Xen. Ages. 2.27–31; Plut. Ages. 36 ff.; Diod. 15.92–3; Nep. Ages. 8.

<sup>16</sup> Hell. 3.2.23 f.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. 4.7.3.

<sup>18</sup> Cases like the persistent confusion/conflation of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus in Book 13 are, of course, quite different and can be left out of account here.

<sup>19</sup> Xen. Hell. 4.4.19; 4.7.2 f.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. A. Bauer, *Hist. Zeitsch.* 65 (1890), 257 n. 1.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. above.

corruption. As any reader of Diodorus is well aware, corruption of proper names is nothing very unusual in this author.

The desirability of emendation has not, of course, entirely escaped earlier scholars. In the first half of the eighteenth century Wesseling came close to the solution proposed here in his note on 15.82.6<sup>22</sup> (though he did not incorporate his conclusions in the text); but neither his observations nor those of later historians<sup>23</sup> have had any effect on the texts of more recent editors.<sup>24</sup> When one considers the puzzled and unhelpful note in the Loeb Diodorus<sup>25</sup> it seems worth while reiterating the point with fresh arguments.

Theoretically, one solution could be to keep the name Agis and delete ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων as an intrusive gloss. But: (i) there is no known Agis to whom the passage could refer; (ii) this emendation would make Diodorus' account quite unlike those of other historians, except to the extent that Xenophon's account leaves room for a subordinate commander of the troops already at Mantinea. Yet Diodorus' description later<sup>26</sup> of Agesilaus as ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς φυλακῆς ἀπολελεμμένος (of which more will have to be said<sup>27</sup>) does not match what Xenophon says about Agesilaus, and there is in general no reason to suppose that Ephorus (Diodorus' source) would follow the Xenophontic account anyway; (iii) there is no independent reason for suspecting the phrase ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων. Although Diodorus regularly puts the qualifying phrase 'king of . . .' after the individual's name, the reverse order is paralleled in 12.63.5; 15.39.2; 15.55.5, and 16.24.1.

Consequently I would propose instead ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων Ἀγ<ης>ί <λαο>ς. A mere slip of the pen on Diodorus' part *might* be responsible; otherwise (and preferably) lipography, the scribe's eye jumping from the first to the second sigma of ΑΓΗΣΙΛΑΟΣ, producing ΑΓΗΣ, then normalized to ΑΓΙΣ.

Palaeographically this emendation seems reasonable enough.<sup>28</sup> But are we entitled to correct Diodorus out of other sources' various remarks about Agesilaus? Or are there eccentricities in his version which suggest that it ought to be left alone? Two peculiarities are to be found in 15.82. Of these one can be dismissed immediately. Diodorus alone says that the Spartans in Arcadia were ravaging the territory of Tegea (15.82.5). But this is quite legitimate in view of Xenophon's remarks about Epaminondas' deportment at Tegea<sup>29</sup> which presuppose action in the immediate vicinity by the Spartans and their allies, and of Polybius' observation that Agesilaus was at Mantinea to force the Thebans in Tegea to battle;<sup>30</sup> what better way than by ravaging the Tegean land?

<sup>22</sup> In his edition of Diodorus, Amsterdam, 1746.

<sup>23</sup> e.g. E. von Stern, *Geschichte der spartanischen und thebanischen Hegemonie* (Dorpat, 1884), p. 235; J. Pohler, *Diodoros als Quelle zur Geschichte von Hellas in der Zeit von Thebens Aufschwung und Grösse* (379–362) (Cassel, 1885), p. 69; A. Bauer, op. cit. (n. 20); G. Underhill *CR* 7 (1893), 15; Peper, op. cit. (n. 10), p. 46.

<sup>24</sup> e.g. L. Dindorf, K. Mueller (Paris,

1878); F. Vogel (Leipzig, 1893); C. H. Oldfather and others (London and Cambridge, Mass. (Loeb edn., vol. vii), 1952).

<sup>25</sup> Vol. cit. (n. 24), p. 183 n. 1.

<sup>26</sup> 15.83.2.

<sup>27</sup> Below, p. 351.

<sup>28</sup> For some parallel examples, see appendix.

<sup>29</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.8 f.

<sup>30</sup> 9.8.2.

The other peculiarity concerns the Cretan runners and the way in which 'Agis' discovered Epaminondas' intentions. Diodorus says that Agis sent a warning to Sparta by Cretan runners.<sup>31</sup> Xenophon says that Agesilaus, on his way north, was warned of Epaminondas' plan by a Cretan.<sup>32</sup> With the proposed emendation, Diodorus' picture of the relations between Agesilaus and the Cretan(s) is directly opposed to that of Xenophon, the only other source to mention Cretans at all. Connected with this is Diodorus' unique allegation that 'Agis' arrived at the idea that Epaminondas would attack Sparta not through information from a third party but by inspired guesswork. Is not Diodorus simply bungling hereabouts and therefore to be dismissed without more ado? I think not. Diodorus has surely got the role of the Cretans right. The Spartan army sometimes contained Cretans<sup>33</sup> and there is no reason why they should not have been present in 362 and have been used as messengers. Any information about Epaminondas' plans ought to come from a deserter from his army<sup>34</sup> and he can be identified as Euthynus of Thespieae, thanks to a fragment of Callisthenes.<sup>35</sup> The reason that Diodorus and Xenophon seem to say contradictory things about the Cretans is that they start out with different conceptions of Agesilaus' whereabouts; for Diodorus he was at Mantinea and sent the Cretans, for Xenophon he was somewhere north of Sparta and was met by them.<sup>36</sup> In short, Diodorus' eccentricity here amounts to no more than that he thought Agesilaus was at Mantinea, a view shared at least by Polybius (? i.e. Callisthenes).

The fact that Diodorus' account suppresses Euthynus' role in favour of Agesilaus' guesswork is a more decided peculiarity, tied up with the comparison drawn there between the Theban and Spartan commanders. In pursuit of the theme, shared by Xenophon and Polybius, of Epaminondas' lack of *τύχη* in his last campaign, Diodorus (or rather, we may assume, Ephorus) makes the failure of the attack on Sparta depend, ironically, on Epaminondas' own reputation for *ἀγχνύουα*, for which his opposite number can make allowance. That may be historically cavalier, but it is not the sort of bungling eccentricity that precludes his identification of the people involved being conservative. Indeed, one might go further and suggest that Ephorus' decision to draw this comparison was dependent on his belief that the Spartan commander was Agesilaus. He shows a certain fondness for the comparison of eminent generals, as can be seen from the implicit ones between Agesilaus and Chabrias and Epaminondas and Chabrias elsewhere in Book XV.<sup>37</sup> Agesilaus and Epaminondas both counted as outstanding military men, especially as possessors of *στρατηγικὴ σύνεσις*;<sup>38</sup> both could symbolize their respective cities in the clash for hegemony. The battle of Mantinea itself marked the definitive end of Spartan power,<sup>39</sup> being *ὁ ὑπὲρ τῶν ὀλων ἄγων* and *ἡ τῶν ὀλων κρίσις*. It would not be surprising if Ephorus took the

<sup>31</sup> 15.82.6; 83.1.

<sup>32</sup> *Hell.* 7.5.9.

<sup>33</sup> e.g. *Xen. Hell.* 4.2.16; 4.7.6.

<sup>34</sup> As Polyb. 9.8.6 and Polyæn. 2.3.10 explicitly say.

<sup>35</sup> *FGH* 124 F 26 (= *Plut. Ages.* 34.4). The part played by Thespieae in the war of the 370s makes a turncoat from there quite plausible (cf. *Xen. Hell.* 5.4.15; 20; 38 f.; 55; 6.3.1; 6.4.10; *Diod.* 15.27.4; 32.2; 33.5;

51.3).

<sup>36</sup> The rhetorical comment about *θεῖά τις μοῖρα* should not deceive us into imagining that Xenophon thought the Cretan came from anywhere but the other Spartan force.

<sup>37</sup> 15.33–5; 68–9.

<sup>38</sup> 15.31 (Agesilaus); 15.39; 52; 56; 88 (Epaminondas).

<sup>39</sup> *Diod.* 15.1.2; 84.3; 85.1.

opportunity to match the two leading statesmen/generals against one another. It would no doubt have suited him better if Agesilaus had been in command at the actual battle of Mantinea. But since that was not so<sup>40</sup> he had to make do with artificially highlighting the clash of the two men over the attack on Sparta, and then introducing into the battle itself the symbolic and schematic embellishment of Epaminondas striking the anonymous Spartan commander with his javelin, thrown *more Homeric*.<sup>41</sup>

One problem remains, created by the proposed emendation. What are we to make of *ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς φυλάκης ἀπολελεμμένος Ἀγησίλαος* in 15.83.2? Bauer<sup>42</sup> thought this a cogent argument against emending 15.82.6 and therefore proposed that Diodorus wrote 'Agis' out of confusion with the first battle of Mantinea. One objection to that has already been noted (above, p. 348) and we may add that, first, Bauer's view makes Diodorus say something quite unparalleled about Agesilaus (viz. that he was in Sparta all along) and, second, that we are left to wonder what Diodorus should have written instead. Pohler,<sup>43</sup> while accepting that Ἀγίς should be emended to Ἀγησίλαος, wished to retain Ἀγησίλαος in 15.83.2, putting it down to Diodoran error. He argued that Diodorus 'knew' that Agesilaus was at Sparta before Epaminondas, but that the Spartan army arrived later. The explanation for this, according to Pohler, was that Agesilaus heard of Epaminondas' movements and returned personally to Sparta, while his army continued on its way to Mantinea (whence it later returned). Diodorus, failing to appreciate this, carelessly and in complete contradiction to what he had written in 15.82.6, supposed Agesilaus to have been in Sparta all along. But quite apart from the fact that Pohler's beliefs about Agesilaus' behaviour are grounded in no other evidence and seem implausible (why should Agesilaus not take his troops back with him to assist in the defence of the city?), this thesis seems to attribute to Diodorus an unnecessary degree of confusion.

Wesseling saw that the answer lies in emending 15.83.2 as well.<sup>44</sup> If we ask ourselves who was most likely to have been left in charge of Sparta, granted that the other king, Cleomenes II, was apparently a nonentity, the answer must be Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, victor in the Tearless Battle of 368.<sup>45</sup> We note immediately that Archidamus actually played a prominent part in the fighting at Sparta in 362, the direction of which seems, in fact, to have been in his hands.<sup>46</sup> This would be natural, if he had been in the city all along. Wesseling proposed Ἀρχίδαμος instead of Ἀγησίλαος in 15.83.2. I would prefer <Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ> Ἀγησιλάου. The patronymic phrase is paralleled at 15.54.6 and the corruption is to be explained by homoeoarcton, with the genitive Ἀγησιλάου changed to a nominative either at the same time or later.

## II

According to all modern texts of Diodorus, after deciding to enforce the autonomy clause of the peace of 372/1 in Boeotia, the Spartans marched forward until they

<sup>40</sup> That is clear from the universal silence of the sources.

<sup>41</sup> Diod. 15.86.4.

<sup>42</sup> Loc. cit. (n. 20).

<sup>43</sup> Loc. cit. (n. 23).

<sup>44</sup> Loc. cit. (n. 22).

<sup>45</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.28 f.; Diod. 15.72;

Plut. *Ages.* 33.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.11 f. (where Archidamus occupies the limelight and erects the trophy) and Isoc. *Epist.* 9.4 (where Archidamus is called the *ἡγεμὼν* of the battle).

came to Coronea and camped there to await the arrival of some allies who had been delayed. Meanwhile, the Thebans took council, and despite the occurrence of several disheartening omens, were convinced by Epaminondas of the desirability of mounting a military resistance. Consequently, Epaminondas led out a Theban army *καὶ προκαταλαβόμενος τὰ περὶ τὴν Κορώνειαν στενὰ κατεστρατοπέδευσε*. When he had discovered that Epaminondas had succeeded in taking up this position, Cleombrotus, the Spartan king, decided to take the coastal route into Boeotia, which eventually brought him to Leuctra.<sup>47</sup>

This version depends on an emendation by Wesseling. According to the Diodorus manuscripts the place at which the Spartans encamped to await late arrivals was not Coronea but Chaeronea (*Χερώνειαν* (PA); *Χαιρώνειαν* (ceteri)).<sup>48</sup> Granted that proper names are susceptible of corruption in the text of Diodorus, as observed and exemplified in Part I of this paper, is there any cogent reason why we should accept this particular alleged corruption? I wish to suggest that there is not.

Wesseling was led to make the emendation by two considerations. Firstly, a similar corruption occurs in other texts. Wesseling quoted Isocrates 16.28: *ὁ γὰρ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ μαχόμενος ἐν Κορωνείᾳ* (Auger: *Χερωνείᾳ* (Γ) *Χερωνία* (Λ') *Χαιρωνείᾳ* (ceteri)) *τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀπέθανεν*;<sup>49</sup> and he might have added the even more pertinent example of Diodorus 12.6.2: *ἐγένετο μάχη καρτερὰ περὶ τὴν Κορώνειαν* (PMF: *Χαιρώνειαν* P<sup>2mGS</sup>) and 12.7.1: *διὰ τὴν ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ περὶ Κορώνειαν* (Wesseling: *Χαιρώνειαν* (codd.)) *μάχην*.<sup>50</sup> However, the mere possibility of a particular corruption (even in the manuscripts of Diodorus) does not establish its existence in our passage. The fact that at 15.52.1 PA have *Χερώνειαν* is, of course, not an indication that there is anything seriously wrong with the text; compare Diodorus 12.6.1 (*Χερώνειαν* (PA)), 16.38.7 (*Χερώνειαν* (RVFM)), 16.89.1 (*τηρι Χερωνείᾳ* P; *τῇ ἐν Χερωνείᾳ* X),<sup>51</sup> Plutarch, *Sulla* 17.6 (*Χερρωνία* G),<sup>52</sup> Stephanus of Byzantium s.v. *Χαιρώνεια*, p. 678, 14–15 Meineke (*κατὰ τὴν μάχην τὴν Χερωνικήν* (R)) passages in which there is no doubt that it is Chaeronea that is referred to. It may be noted that the readings of *Χαιρώνεια* in some or all of the manuscripts of Diodorus 12.6.2, 7.1 (cf. above) are probably due to the supposition of scribes that, because *Χαιρώνεια* appears in a passage (as it does at 12.6.1) all occurrences of a similar-sounding name in the same immediate context should be changed to follow suit. In so far as the inclination of modern editors of 15.52.1 to change *Χαιρώνειαν* to *Κορώνειαν* proceeds from a similar type of supposition, it ought to be resisted, unless substantive arguments can be produced in its favour.

This leads us to Wesseling's second consideration. According to 15.52.7,

<sup>47</sup> 15.52.1–53.1.

<sup>48</sup> 15.52.1. Sigla as in Vogel's edition (above, n. 24). Wesseling's emendation is proposed in his note ad loc.

<sup>49</sup> Sigla as in edition of G. Matthieu/E. Brémond (Paris, 1928).

<sup>50</sup> Sigla as in edition of M. Casewitz (Paris, 1972). For an example of the reverse corruption, see Stephanus of Byzantium s.v.

*Χαιρώνεια*, p. 678, 2 Meineke: *Ἐκαταῖος Εὐρώπῃ... ἐν δὲ Χαιρώνειᾳ (Κορώνεια MSS.) πόλιν τὰ πρῶτα.*

<sup>51</sup> Sigla for Book 12 as in edition mentioned in n. 50; those for Book 16 from Vogel (n. 24 above).

<sup>52</sup> Sigla as in edition of K. Ziegler (Leipzig, 1973). Cf. also G and L<sup>1</sup> at 16.14; 17.2; 17.8.

53.1 Cleombrotus' decision to march into Boeotia by the coast road was due to Epaminondas' having taken up a position in the narrows near Coronea. Wesseling apparently supposed that Epaminondas' choice of that place as a line of defence was dictated by the fact that Cleombrotus was already at Coronea<sup>53</sup> and that Cleombrotus' knowledge of Epaminondas' position was derived from autopsy. Such suppositions are, however, to say the least, not necessary ones. (a) Granted that Cleombrotus started out in Phocis<sup>54</sup> and was supposed to be attacking Thebes, the route via Coronea was the natural one for him to take; that had been established by the precedents of 394 and 395 B.C.<sup>55</sup> The slightest move by Cleombrotus in that direction (for example, a move to Chaeronea) would have justified Epaminondas in marching out to the narrows at Petra.<sup>56</sup> Thebes would not, after all, have been slow to attempt to exclude the Spartans from as much of Boeotia as possible. (b) The assumption of autopsy clearly lacks cogent *a priori* basis. Cleombrotus could have kept himself informed of Theban movements without having to have them under his very nose.

Other doubts and comments suggest themselves. Firstly, Wesseling's emendation creates the slight problem that Diodorus offers no explanation of—or comment on—Epaminondas' managing to take up position so close to the Spartan army. The experience of Agesilaus in 394 B.C. had demonstrated that this was an area in which a Theban army might be expected to offer serious resistance. Should not Cleombrotus, having come as far as Coronea (presumably precisely because he was aware of the strategic importance of the area), have attempted to secure the passage beyond the city? One might say that Cleombrotus had previously shown some lack of application to military tasks in hand<sup>57</sup> and that the situation here merely constitutes another example of this. If the manuscripts gave the reading *Κορώνειαν* this might be a legitimate remark; but since they do not we are hardly entitled or required to regard it as an argument that that is what they *ought* to read.

Secondly, no other source says that Cleombrotus advanced as far into Boeotia as Coronea. This tends to be regarded as unsurprising lack of detail on their part.<sup>58</sup> But it is worth stressing that the other sources not only do not say that Cleombrotus went that far, but are at least totally consistent with the hypothesis that he did not. Xenophon writes that, when it became clear that the Thebans were neither leaving the cities autonomous nor disbanding their army, Cleombrotus marched into Boeotia. *καὶ ἡ μὲν οἱ Θηβαῖοι ἐμβαλεῖν αὐτὸν ἐκ τῶν Φωκέων προσεδόκων καὶ ἐπὶ στενῷ τινὶ ἐφύλαττον οὐκ ἐμβάλλει, διὰ θισβῶν δὲ ὀρευνῇ καὶ ἀπροσδόκητον πορευθεὶς κτλ.* There is not the slightest hint that Cleombrotus went into the body of Boeotia and *ἡ μὲν οἱ Θηβαῖοι αὐτὸν ἐκ τῶν Φωκέων προσεδόκων* rather suggests that the Theban calculation was based (as it was

<sup>53</sup> That Epaminondas was acting on the expectation that Cleombrotus would come via Coronea is explicit in Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.3 and Paus. 9.13.3. Cf. below.

<sup>54</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.2 f.

<sup>55</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.10 f., esp. 16 (394); id. 3.5.17–18 (395). It should be noted that the point about the narrows near Coronea is that they control main roads from Phocis *either* via Chaeronea *or* via Lebadeia.

<sup>56</sup> For this identification of the narrows round Coronea, see J. Wolter in J. Kromayer–G. Veith *Antike Schlachtfelder* iv (Berlin, 1924/31), p. 291; H. Beister, *Untersuchungen zu der Zeit der thebanischen Hegemonie* (Munich, 1970), p. 24.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.13 ff.; 59.

<sup>58</sup> e.g. Beister, op. cit. (n. 56), p. 23. Many however evade the issue altogether, cf. n. 77.

suggested above it might have been) purely on natural suppositions about the route that would be taken by an army invading from Phocis.<sup>59</sup> Pausanias says that Epaminondas ἀντεκάθητο ὑπὲρ τῆς Κηφισίδος λίμνης ὡς ποιησομένων ταύτῃ . . . τὴν ἐσβολὴν which is quite consistent with the Spartans not having come there *yet*, and continues that Cleombrotus ἐπὶ Ἀμβρόσσου τρέπεται τῆς Φωκέων. There is no cause to interpret τρέπεται as 'turned back' (i.e. from Coronea). All it means is that Ambrossos (= mod. Distomo) was not on the route the Thebans expected Cleombrotus to take.<sup>60</sup> At best it leaves entirely open at what point on that route Cleombrotus changed his mind. One may suspect that, were it not for the influence of an emended text of Diodorus, everyone would naturally suppose the point to be a fairly early one.<sup>61</sup>

Thirdly, positive arguments in favour of reading *Χαιρώνεια* may be advanced. (i) Cleombrotus was suspected (not entirely without reason) of not taking as hard a line about Thebes as some of his fellow-Spartans<sup>62</sup>—in particular of being unwilling to force the issue with them to the point of battle. In 376 B.C. he had given up the attempt to cross Cithaeron rather than press the attack and force an entry into Boeotia.<sup>63</sup> In 378 he entered Boeotia but forebore to do any damage, thus provoking no Theban counter-attack and no battle.<sup>64</sup> On the eve of Leuctra he had to be chivvied into committing himself to battle.<sup>65</sup> One might therefore ask oneself what his attitude was at the start of the Leuctra campaign. Might he not have hoped that, since the Thebans would not succumb to the threat of invasion, they might be more impressed if he transferred his army across the border to Chaeronea, the border town on the Boeotian side?<sup>66</sup> An earlier Spartan king had once adopted a similar policy in a different context. In 431 B.C. at the start of the Peloponnesian War, Archidamus entered Attica and settled down to besiege Oenoe. His hope was that Athens would capitulate to the imminent threat of damage to their land (once it was clear from his arrival at Oenoe that the invasion of Attica was no empty threat) and that therefore the

<sup>59</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.3.

<sup>60</sup> It is perhaps worth noting that the fact that Cleombrotus went ἐπὶ Ἀμβρόσσου is possibly better in accord with his having started at Chaeronea than Coronea. To get from the latter through Helicon to the south coast and thence via Creusis to Leuctra, Cleombrotus could have followed the route south from Coronea to the plain of Koukoura and thence to Thisbe and Creusis (cf. A. Philippson, *Griechische Landschaften* i.2 (Frankfurt a/M, 1951), 443–4 and, for orientation, the maps in Beister, op. cit. (opp. p. 72), or A. R. Burn, *ABSA* 44 (1949), plate 42), rather than make the immense detour via Ambrossos. (There is absolutely no reason to suppose that, at the time he set out, the contingent under Chaereas with which he later clashed (Paus. loc. cit.) had yet taken up a position e.g. at the plain of Koukoura.) Beister explains Cleombrotus' not having taken this route by the supposition that he was unwilling to make the ascent of Helicon in enemy country and gives

countenance also to Wolter's idea that the king wished to give the deceitful impression that he was making a total withdrawal (Beister, op. cit., p. 36). These explanations may or may not do for the data as usually conceived. But if Cleombrotus started at Chaeronea, there is nothing to explain, since to go ἐπὶ Ἀμβρόσσου merely involved following the main road to Delphi as far as the Schiste Hodos and then continuing south, and this was a natural way for him to go.

<sup>61</sup> The narratives of some of the authors mentioned in n. 77, who ignore Diodorus, seem to support this suspicion.

<sup>62</sup> See Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.4–5 plus the passages in n. 57.

<sup>63</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.59.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid. 13 f.

<sup>65</sup> Id. 6.4.4–5.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Thuc. 4.76.3; Steph. Byz. s.v. *Χαιρώνεια*; Paus. 9.40.12 (Chaeronea having a common border with Phocian Panopeus); Beister, op. cit. (n. 56), p. 26.



war would prove unnecessary.<sup>67</sup> Archidamus was, let it be noted, like Cleombrotus suspected of excessive sympathy with the enemy.<sup>68</sup> Archidamus' gambit had, of course, proved unsuccessful. But Cleombrotus' calculation in 372/1, if it was of a similar sort, might be accounted not entirely unreasonable. On previous occasions the Thebans had acquiesced eventually in Common Peaces that required the autonomy of Boeotia. In 387/6 the mobilization of the Spartan army and its advance as far as Tegea had been sufficient;<sup>69</sup> in 375/4 Athenian threats had apparently had a similar result.<sup>70</sup> Now that the latter Peace had, by virtue of the enforced withdrawal of Spartan garrisons, afforded the basis for a more complete, though improper, Theban control of central/east Boeotia than anything achieved in the early 370s, greater intransigence *might* be expected. But the appearance of a Spartan army on Boeotian soil (especially if this might provoke anti-Theban moves from other Boeotian states<sup>71</sup>) could, to the optimistic, seem sufficient to secure the desired result without bloodshed. Judging by the wheedling and trickery Epaminondas had to indulge in to make the Thebans fight at all,<sup>72</sup> one might say that Cleombrotus was nearly proved right. (ii) Finally there is the issue of *οἱ καθυστεροῦντες τῶν συμμάχων*. How could there be any such, when Cleombrotus already had an army in Phocis, ready to move? Beister explains this as resulting from Diodorus' incorrect assumption that Cleombrotus set out from the Peloponnese with a new army.<sup>73</sup> That might be so, but since Beister himself is prepared to envisage the collecting of fresh levies from local (central Greek) allies,<sup>74</sup> I do not see why this should not be what Diodorus is referring to.<sup>75</sup> If that is correct, then Chaeronea might seem a perfectly reasonable place to await their arrival; it left Cleombrotus in fairly close contact with the possible sources of such levies, as well as providing a rallying-point for Boeotian disaffection. Moreover, given that Cleombrotus' policy as outlined above was perhaps out of line with a lot of Spartan feeling, he needed an excuse for his delay at Chaeronea (just as Archidamus found the excuse of the prolonged siege of Oenoe). Talk of waiting for further allies might fill the gap. It might also have been hoped that, if the Thebans came to hear of it,<sup>76</sup> it would put additional pressure on them to surrender.

These positive arguments in favour of reading *Χαιρώνειαν* may or may not command respect. But the earlier arguments against reading *Κορώνειαν* seem sufficient to require us to ponder somewhat more carefully than has usually been the case the traditional reading of Diodorus' text. Many modern students

<sup>67</sup> Thuc. 2.18.5.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid. 3 f.

<sup>69</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.33.

<sup>70</sup> Isocr. 14.37.

<sup>71</sup> According to Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.4.6) the Theban leaders feared that if they acted with pusillanimity they would be rewarded by the revolt of the *περιοικίδες πόλεις*.

<sup>72</sup> Diod. 15.52; 53.3–54.4; Plut. *Pelop.* 20, *Demosth.* 20; Polyae. 2.3.8; 12; Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.7.

<sup>73</sup> Op. cit. (n. 56), p. 24.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid. p. 25.

<sup>75</sup> It might be noted that if Cleombrotus

was aware in advance (as he surely was) that the reliability of his Peloponnesian allies was not all that great, then the inclination to acquire the largest possible element from central Greek allies, who perhaps had a greater personal interest in the breaking of Theban power, would be very understandable. If a battle had ultimately to be fought then their presence would be advantageous; and in any case the strength of the excuse they afforded for delay (see text) would be enhanced.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.47–9 for the calculated use of 'loose talk'.

of Leuctra have contrived to evade the issue altogether by taking no specific notice of Diodorus' version.<sup>77</sup> Of those who have not taken that course only A. R. Burn seems to raise a doubt about Cleombrotus' presence at Coronea: 'He [sc. Cleombrotus] demonstrated first before Coronea, or so Diodorus says . . . εἰ τῷ ἰκανῶς πιστεύειν'.<sup>78</sup> I suggest that Burn's perception that a question mark is in order is a fair one, but would stress that it is not Diodorus' but Wesseling's claim to trust that is really the point in issue.<sup>79</sup>

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#### APPENDIX: EXAMPLES OF CORRUPTION OF AGESILAUS/AGESIPOLIS TO AGIS

1. Maximus of Tyre 35. 8c (H. Hobein's edition (Leipzig, 1910)): Ἀγῆσιλαος Λυσάνδρῳ φθονεῖ καὶ Ἀγησίπολις Ἀγῶ μισεῖ καὶ Κινάδῳ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν ἐπιβουλεύει . . . The context is fourth-century events, and the hatred of Agesipolis for Agis must be a reference to the relations of *Agesilaus* and *Agesipolis* in the 380s (Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.20 (with 4.7.2 f.; 5.2.3); Diod. 15.19.4; Plut. *Ages.* 20), which though publicly friendly (Xen., Plut., loc. cit.) could be regarded as in reality bad (cf. Xenophon's ὡς ἀντιπάλῳ and his failure to mention *Agesipolis* in the *Agesilaus*). What we want is Ἀγησίπολις Ἀγ<ησ>ί<λαο>ν μισεῖ. Author error cannot be ruled out (Maximus was capable, e.g., of confusing Critoboulos and Critias twice, 20.8a (contrast Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.30) and 21.3a, though in this case there is the palliating factor that Xen. *Mem.*, loc. cit., concerned Critias' sexual tastes and there is also a passage in *Mem.* about Critoboulos' sexual tastes (1.3.8 f.)), but corruption remains a possibility. It might arise from an abbreviation (Ἀγῷ) for Ἀγῆσιλαον (though Hobein's evidence, op. cit., pp. 1–li, for signs of tachygraphy in the text of Maximus is not particularly convincing) or from lipography plus confusion of O and C (i.e. ΑΓΗCΙΑΑΟΝ → ΑΓΗΟΝ → ΑΓΙΝ).

2. Herodotus 8.131 has a Eurypontid King Hegesileos (i.e. *Agesilaus*); id. 6.65

<sup>77</sup> e.g. E. Curtius, *History of Greece* iv (Eng. trans.) (London, 1872), 385; G. Grote, *History of Greece*<sup>4</sup> viii (London, 1872), 167; J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias' Description of Greece*, v (London, 1897), 50; K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*<sup>2</sup> iii.1 (Berlin/Leipzig, 1922), 166; R. Cohen, *Histoire grecque* iii (Paris, 1936), 148; P. Cloché, *Thèbes de Béotie* (Namur, n.d.), p. 130; N. G. L. Hammond, *History of Greece*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford, 1968), p. 493.

<sup>78</sup> Op. cit. (n. 60), p. 321. Pohler's reference (op. cit. (n. 23), p. 42) to 'vergebliche Versuche über Chaironeia und Koroneia [sc. zu gehen]' may suggest that he read Χαῖρῶνεια but leaves it unclear whether he thought Cleombrotus got as far as Coronea. J. B. Bury, *History of Greece* (London, 1924), pp. 592 f., has Cleombrotus start the campaign when 'posted near

Chaeronea in the gate between Phocis and Boeotia . . . ' which may also imply reading Χαῖρῶνεια. In neither case is any attention drawn to the textual problem, and in both cases it is possible that the authors derived their reference to Chaeronea from *a priori* calculation.

<sup>79</sup> Since neither the recent very full discussion of the lead-up to Leuctra in Beister, op. cit. (n. 56), pp. 13–72, nor the older treatments of W. K. Pritchett (*Studies in Ancient Greek Topography* i (Berkeley, 1965), pp. 49 f.), and J. Wolter (op. cit. (n. 56), pp. 290 f.), hint that the text might be in doubt, the necessity of making this point seems all the stronger.

Robin Seager was kind enough to read an earlier draft of this paper. He should not of course be held responsible for any *bêtises* that may persist.

calls the same man Agis. Many editors let this stand (e.g. Hude, Stein, Macan, Legrand) as a source discrepancy or on the supposition that 'Agis' is a hypororistic form of Hegesileos. But perhaps corruption at 6.65 is at least a possibility worth considering. The process would, admittedly, be a rather complicated one, and one should perhaps think of the deliberate introduction of a known Spartan royal name, in the Doric rather than Ionic form, by a scribe faced by an incomprehensible (and now irrecoverable) corruption of Ἡγησίλεω. Cf. Poralla, *Prosopographie der Lakedaimonier* (Breslau, 1913), p. 8.

3. Suda: Ἄγης, Ἄγιδος ὁ Πανσανίου . . . (A 239 in A. Adler, *Suidae Lexicon* (Leipzig, 1928)). The body of the entry related to the capture of Mantinea in the 380s, the hero of which was Agesipolis, son of Pausanias (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.4–7; Diod. 15.5; 12; Paus. 8.8.7). The error, which is not noted by Adler ad loc., presumably occurred in a text used by the compiler of the Suda, since the entry is in its correct place alphabetically; therefore, either in some text of Pausanias, loc. cit. (for the entry reproduces that passage) or in some intermediate excerpt.